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ABSTRACT: This paper throws some light on the nature of argumentation, its use
and advantages, within the setting of doctor–patient interaction. It claims that argu-
mentation can be used by doctors to oﬀer patients reasons that work as ontological
conditions for enhancing the decision making process, as well as to preserve the
institutional nature of their relationship with patients. In support of these claims,
selected arguments from real-life interactions are presented in the second part of the
paper, and analysed by means of a model of argumentation borrowed from classical
rhetoric, and reﬁned according to the modern orientation of the pragma-dialectic
approach.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In Plato’s time argumentation was already linked to physicians.1 Today,
however, speaking about argumentation in doctor–patient interaction
provokes some concern and disagreement. As we have personally expe-
rienced in delivering papers on the subject, there is a general conviction
that doctors, if they use argumentation, exercise power, inﬂuence and
diminish patients’ ability to choose for a treatment freely. As Dickinson
(1998, pp. 74–75) claims, argumentation tends to be associated with
eristic (and, we add, fallacious) dialogues. That doctors should not
inﬂuence patients in choosing one treatment option instead of another
and, thus, that they should not use argumentation, is clearly stated by
Eddy (1990). We believe that most of these concerns result from precon-
ceptions linked to the idea that argumentation falls under the instru-
ments of a rather sophistic rhetoric. In answer to these preconceptions,
it must be noted that from the time of Aristotle onward, argumentation
has been explored by schools of prominent scholars as an instrument of
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intellectual reﬁnement for enhancing eﬃcacy in human communication.
To quote a recent case among the most relevant explorations, the prag-
ma-dialectic approach of the Amsterdam school emblematically shows
how argumentation can indeed be structured to solve diﬀerences of
opinions according to an ideal model of critical discussion.2
A few recent contributions tackle the issue of argumentation in
medical encounters.3 Yet, to our knowledge and understanding, they
do not seem to pay enough attention to the place that argumentation
has in the doctor–patient relationship and, consequently, to its nature
within the peculiarity of this interaction. This attention, however, is of
fundamental importance to fully evaluate the potentialities that, we be-
lieve, argumentation has among the interactional tools at doctors’
disposal. Without entering at this stage into the details of what argu-
mentation is, it is suﬃcient to say that the process generally aims at
convincing the listener or reader of the acceptability of a standpoint.
Clearly, this occurs when the listener or reader explicitly, implicitly or
potentially doubts the acceptability of the standpoint, or has a diﬀer-
ent standpoint. This aspect concerning the diﬀerence of opinions is
precisely what makes argumentation in medical consultation so pecu-
liar. Between a doctor and a patient, in fact, there is no initial conﬂict
of standpoints. Both the doctor and the patient agree on the fact that
the health of the latter must represent the ﬁnal aim of the consultation
itself. In this sense, argumentation only enters in a diﬀerent stage of
their interaction. Having anticipated this claim, this paper has two
main aims. First, we intend to illustrate the place, implications and
advantages that argumentation has in the doctor–patient consultation.
In so doing, we shall lay down some essential bases for supporting the
appropriateness of argumentation in this setting. Second, we shall
make some analytical investigations of examples of real-life argumen-
tations within the context of informed consent. This context is indeed
intrinsically argumentative, insofar as doctors need patients’ signatures
before giving speciﬁc treatments. And signing the consent implies that
the patient is convinced that the treatment suggested is what s/he
should do in that speciﬁc context. The present investigation is expected
to underline some analytical aspects that it is important to consider in
order to ground the study of argumentation in medical encounter on a
more theoretical level and, ultimately, to enhance an optimisation of
the argumentative practice in the ﬁeld.
2. THE PLACE OF ARGUMENTATION IN DOCTOR–PATIENT
INTERACTION
As already mentioned above, the doctor–patient interactional context is
not traditionally perceived as argumentative. In the initial stage of the
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consultation both the doctor and the patient agree on the fundamental
standpoint that the health of the patient, as ﬁnal aim of the consulta-
tion, is all that really matters. Patients go to see their doctors
essentially to ask for advice. It can be generalised that they normally
lack any a priori attitude to argue with their doctors. While doctors
possess the technical expertise on medical matter, patients, in the
majority of cases, do not have a suﬃcient scientiﬁc or expert knowl-
edge to eﬀectively engage with doctors’ suggestions on equal terms.
In this sense, communication between doctors and patients implies an
almost inevitable disparity of competence that ideally should prevent a
real disagreement of points of view to arise on an issue. However, what
seems a rather straightforward situation is clouded by a main factor
that justiﬁes doctors’ use of argumentation in daily practice. In contrast
to mathematics, that appears as a paradigm of precision and certainty,
where certain moves lead to others predictable and expectable, in medi-
cine the nature of the nexus cause-eﬀects can neither be assured, nor
predicted with certainty (Schulz, 2006). To lessen the consequent arbi-
trariness in the use of medication prescription and diagnostic testing,
the new paradigm for de-emphasizing intuition in medical practice
known as ‘‘evidence-based medicine’’ has been introduced.4
Yet, even if advice ultimately derives from a careful consideration of
objective parameters, doctors are constantly in the position of having to
make clinical decisions at different levels. In particular, what is relevant
for the perspective of this paper, doctors are faced with the evidence
that there are always more treatments (including the option of non-
treatment) available for the same disease. And this means that, espe-
cially but not exclusively at the level of treatments, what doctors suggest
results for the most part from their own choices among several possibili-
ties for improving the quality of patients’ lives. Even if medicine has al-
ways faced such limitations, in the past the subjective nature of doctors’
advice would have not impacted on patients’ compliance highly. Medi-
cine was surrounded by the idea that the doctor, like the shaman, held
the key to sickness and death. Nowadays, however, due to the amount
of information available and the general inﬂuence that traditional and
new media have on people’s decisions,5 patients are becoming increas-
ingly more aware of the risks linked to the choice of one treatment in-
stead of another (Schulz, 2003). Physicians widely recognise that
patients are becoming more and more critical about advice received: pa-
tients are inclined to gather information from sources other than their
doctors, and to ponder what doctors suggest on the basis of their lay-
knowledge. In this sense, provided that the doctor and the patient agree
on the fact that the health of the latter represents the unique and ﬁnal
aim of all the eﬀorts of the former, doctors are now in the need of legiti-
mising their standpoints on what they see as the best way to treat the
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particular cases encountered. When the reliability of doctors’ decisions
is no longer taken for granted, argumentation begins to play a role. To
address the potential risks linked to a dismissal of the doctor’s authority
– risks that especially concern the compliance of treatment from pa-
tients – this authority can be reinforced by adducing reasons in support
of the doctors’ points of view. Since medical knowledge risks invoking
disagreement, doctors can use argumentation as a technique to manage
disagreement. Indeed, as we have shown elsewhere (Schulz and Rubinel-
li, 2006), four argumentative action types occur in the medical consulta-
tion when doctors justify a diagnosis, justify a treatment, correct
patients’ wrong behaviours or actions and minimize patients’ concerns.
3. FUNCTIONS OF ARGUMENTATION IN DOCTOR–PATIENT INTERVIEW
As we shall show in this paragraph, the use of argumentation not only
favours doctors’ expression of their expertise, but also becomes an
effective way of enhancing the quality of the information provided to
patients. Again, we will argue that argumentation plays a prominent
role for balancing the institutional nature of the relationship between
doctors and patients. Here, we are dealing with an aspect of the doc-
tor–patient interaction that, given the current debate on the individu-
alization of an ideal model of interaction, it is crucial to clarify.
3.1. To give reasons in support of a claim
In supporting our hypotheses, it is necessary to consider the deﬁnition
of argumentation in more detail. By drawing on the basic classical
explanation of the term, argumentation is the process of giving pre-
mises in support of conclusions. To argue means to give reasons for
proving the truth of standpoints on issue which are intrinsically prob-
lematic and allow different solutions (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst,
2004). As mentioned earlier, medical cases are in essence problematic.
By using argumentation, it then becomes clear that doctors can justify
their decisions both at the level of diagnosis and prognosis. At the
same time, however, while giving reasons they provide patients with
the basis for reﬂecting upon the reasonableness of what is advised.
Indeed, when they deliver medical advice in the form of arguments,
doctors do not only suggest certain treatments and give indications on
the ways these should be followed. They also inform patients on why,
for example, certain treatments (and not others) have been prescribed
to them speciﬁcally, and why these treatments should be followed in
certain ways. Argumentation, then, oﬀers information that can be uti-
lized by patients as points of reference for structuring their decisions
on the actions to be taken. Insofar as this information is shaped in the
format of reasons, the process of argumentation:
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• adds motivators to the internal reasons (factual information and inten-
tional states) and to other propositionally structured entities such as
needs, commitments and requirements that the patient might have;
• stimulates the appraisal of the relative weight of the whole set of moti-
vators as a way to arrive at a decision.
3.2. Argumentation and action
Another characteristic of argumentation deserves special emphasis. As
pointed out earlier, the idea that argumentation prevents patients’ free-
dom, insofar as it strengthens doctors’ standpoints and impedes objec-
tive decision making, is rather spread. Admittedly, in term of its
perlocutionary force, argumentation aims at persuading or convincing
someone of the acceptability of a certain standpoint. Yet, even in those
cases where argumentations are perceived by people as convincing for
their contents and form, this conviction is not enough to motivate ac-
tions in the outcome. Just to quote an example, many people do not stop
smoking despite several interventions arguing against the side-effects of
smoking, and despite the fact that most of those who do not stop smok-
ing believe in the soundness of the current argumentations against this
habit. The risk of patronising patients’ decisions through argumentation
is really low. It becomes even lower in cases where, like in most of doc-
tor–patient interactions, argumentation does not aim to persuade some-
one of the acceptability of a theoretical claim, but it is aimed at
promoting behavioural changes. Indeed, individual decisions in terms of
behaviour are ultimately affected by a series of other factors that, as so-
cial scientists know well, it is very difﬁcult to determine in its compo-
nents. Argumentation can surely work as a tool for reducing the gap
between the reasons adduced by doctors in support of a certain advice
and the actualisation of the decision itself – that is, the patient’s actual
performance on the advice given. However, it does not impose the
speaker’s standpoint over an interlocutor. It simply offers the interlocu-
tor reasons to think about its acceptability and to adhere to a certain
opinion if s/he believes in its reasonableness (Rigotti and Greco, 2005).
In other words, argumentation is not coercive. It rather stimulates
in the interlocutor a critical approach toward an issue.6 It is proba-
bly not an exaggeration to claim that argumentation is actually the
only instrument that enables a reasoned compliance of the patient,
where the patient takes a certain course of action advised by a doc-
tor because s/he has understood and believes in the inner motiva-
tions behind it. By drawing on one of the fundamental assumptions
of the pragma-dialectic theory of argumentation, an argumentative
discussion enables parties to deal in a rational way with an issue
that allows diﬀerent solutions. Of course, this becomes particularly
relevant when the doctor and the patient explicitly disagree on the
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course of action to be taken. Argumentation can be used ‘‘to try to
determine to what extent a given standpoint is defensible’’.7 In the
medical setting, by using argumentation the doctor not only sup-
ports his standpoint to the patient, but also exposes the patient to
the value of the standpoint itself, enhancing the patient’s critical
reﬂection on it. We are here dealing with a constructive dimension
of argumentation. This applies both, in a mixed-diﬀerence-of-opinion
situation, when the patient has already his/her own idea about what
should be done to treat his/her disease, and can thus use doctor’s
advice to make a comparison, reﬁne/correct or further support his/
her standpoint, and in a non-mixed-diﬀerence-of-opinion situation,
when he/she has no idea and needs to develop one in order to
decide on a certain treatment.8 Argumentation appears here as a
ﬂexible instrument that can be used for diﬀerent purposes in diﬀer-
ent contexts. It only presupposes that the speaker who constructs an
argument (e.g. the doctor) holds an opinion about a problem (what
s/he thinks the best course of action that the patient should take is),
and is willing to present this opinion to the addressee who is more
properly a decision maker.9 Whether or not the patient is active or
passive, and whether s/he has already his/her own opinion is rele-
vant for the way an argumentative dialogue, in the outcome, might
develop, but not for the application of argumentation per se.10
3.3. Argumentation as a balance between doctor and patient
The last point to consider in discussing the nature and advantages of
argumentation in doctor–patient relationship recalls the actual debate
on the individuation of an ideal model of discussion between the two
parties. In what follows, we shall sketch the main developments of this
debate in order to show how argumentation can indeed acquire a
prominent role among the instruments for optimising the relationship
between doctors and patients.
After the decay of paternalism, where doctors had a prominent and
dominant position, today the tendency is to favour interpretations of
the doctor–patient relationship that emphasise patients’ autonomy:
patients are seen as competent to make decisions that concern their own
health.11 Leaving aside the contract model that, as Walton correctly
criticises, cannot be a normative ideal of the doctor–patient relation-
ship,12 the reference is ﬁrst of all to the ‘‘informed model’’, where delib-
eration and decision making steps are the sole prerogative of the
patient. In this context, ‘‘information transfer is seen as the key respon-
sibility and only legitimate contribution of the doctor to the decision
making process’’ (Charles et al., 2004, p.781; Quill and Brody, 1996).
In the informed model, the doctor is perceived as a technical
specialist who only provides the patient with the relevant information,
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while the patient is free to decide on her/his own. But this role-codiﬁca-
tion, if it is done in full respect for autonomy and self-determination of
the patient, is not unproblematic. As Chin (2002) points out, relegating
the role of physician to that of an information-provider plays down the
intrinsic inequality of knowledge and skills between doctors and
patients. It somehow dismantles the whole nature of doctor–patient
relationship that rests on the assumption that the patient seeks assis-
tance from the doctor who is able to provide it. Here it is important to
recall what Davis (1997) stresses in his attempt to rebalance exactly this
current interpretation of the roles of doctors and patients. Considering
the issue from its more philosophical implications, when the patient is
ill, s/he has needs that deserve fulﬁlment. ‘‘This’’, according to the au-
thor (1997, p. 178), ‘‘is what the physician presents herself as equipped
and committed to provide: fulﬁlment and satisfaction of the ontological
need for healing’’. Accordingly, what is primary to the identity of the
physician as health professional is the ‘‘central act of profession’’.
Following Pellegrino’s interpretation (1979, p. 46), Davies interprets
this act by considering the etymological origins of ‘‘profession’’ from
the Latin proﬁteor, meaning ‘‘to declare aloud and publicity’’ and ‘‘to
promise’’. And this promise can be articulated in what Pellegrino and
Thomasma (1981, p. 48) call the ‘‘curative intent’’ of the physician.13
Moreover, it can be added that patients might not be in the posi-
tion of making choices for their beneﬁt. Considering patients who
have only a lay knowledge of medicine, there is a very high possibility
that the absence of valuable advice from the doctors’ side outweighs
the danger that the ﬁnal choice is made as a result of inappropriate
inﬂuence (e.g. the inﬂuence of people’s commonplaces about medical
treatments and of unreliable sources available from the internet). The
risk is especially high when patients present themselves with a serious
or life threatening illness, and when time constraints might not allow
wrong decisions in treatments. Indeed, studies show that biophysical
and psychosocial factors might highly impact on patients’ capacity to
make informed choices.14
In an attempt to avoid the unbalance within the doctor–patient rela-
tionship that the informed model codiﬁes, the literature fosters another
scheme of relationship known as the ‘‘shared model’’, where doctors
and patients share all stages of the decision making process simulta-
neously (Charles et al., 2004, p. 781). Doctors and patients express
their preferences and end up agreeing on the decisions to be made in ‘‘a
dialogue rather than an unregulated supplying of information from one
party to the other’’ (Walton, 1985, p. 108). Within this model, doctors
do not only provide information but contribute to the decision-making
process via negotiation that is, by presenting reasonable settlements
that both doctor and patient can live with. An interactive dialogue
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between doctors and patients, according to the forms and models of
dialogues that Walton describes in his monographic work, is surely
ideal.15 However, it encounters some main diﬃculties that need to be
addressed. First of all, given that in the typical medical encounter
patients tend to be passive and submissive,16 it is not clear within the
literature what instruments doctors can use to engage in a dialogue
with their patients. Moreover, the ‘‘shared model’’ is not ideal for deal-
ing with clinical situations where treatments do not admit negotiation.
To quote an examples, if a patient is not willing to have chemotherapy,
while the doctors knows that there is no other option, it is diﬃcult to
ﬁnd a middle term to agree on. Negotiation in term of length and nat-
ure of chemotherapy to avoid side eﬀects like hair loss would surely
reduce, or even cancel, the potentially beneﬁcial eﬀects of the therapy.
The above limitations support the idea that doctors, without compro-
mising patients’ freedom in making the ﬁnal decision, must be in the
position to give advice in order to arouse patients’ response and promote
a proper negotiation for those cases where negotiation is actually possible.
Again, they must be able to express their views whenever the situation is
not negotiable, is limited by time constraints or requires clariﬁcation.
In this light, a third model of doctor–patient interaction becomes
relevant, namely the relationship-centred model discussed by Quill and
Brody (1996). This pattern assumes that an open dialogue, in which
the physician frankly admits his or her biases, is ultimately a better
protector of the patient’s right to autonomous choice than artiﬁcial
neutrality would be. For Quill and Brody, doctors have to oﬀer rec-
ommendations in the full service of patients’ best interests, and in
order to promote an informed autonomy. Doctors’ biases should then
not be hidden, but should constitute an integral and explicit part of
the medical encounter. If this is the case, by considering what we have
pointed out in the previous paragraphs, it appears that argumentation
is an adequate instrument for the expression of doctors’ standpoints.
Argumentation can be used to balance an interaction where the doctor
performs his/her expert role in front of a patient who seeks expertise
in the ﬁrst place, but who is the only responsible for the ﬁnal decision
to have a certain treatment. By constructing arguments doctors do not
patronise the interaction (as they would do if they imposed their biases
without supporting them with reasons), but rather they expose their
standpoints to be evaluated and pondered by patients.
4. INVESTIGATING REAL-LIFE ARGUMENTS
4.1. The informed consent
As anticipated in the introduction, the second part of this study is devoted
to an exploration of some real-life argumentations. A comprehensive
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analysis of the way argumentations are performed in doctor–patient
consultations would surely exceed the limits of the present investigation.
However, it is our aim to underline some of the relevant factors to be
taken into consideration for basing more systematic research in the ﬁeld.
To conduct our investigation we have recorded a set of 10 doc-
tor–patient consultations in the ﬁeld of oncology, in collaboration with
three Italian physicians. Transcripts of the original consultations have
been made by a Master student of the Faculty of Communication Sci-
ences of the University of Lugano, according to a revised version of Jef-
ferson’s guidelines (Sacks et al., 1978). In the following sections we shall
present a selection of relevant passages translated in English. Original
Italian texts are available upon request.17 The dialogues recorded run
from the moment in which the doctor communicates the diagnosis to the
patient, and explains the treatments available, to the signature of the so-
called informed consent. In what follows, we shall ﬁrst discuss brieﬂy the
inner constitution of the informed consent and the main diﬃculties relat-
ing to its application. This will help us individuate those aspects of the
informed consent which can function as a point of reference for the
analysis of the dialogues.
The informed consent is a legal doctrine that has been elaborated
by the courts over a number of years. It requires that doctors, before
administering medical treatments, elicit the voluntary informed con-
sent of patients. To do so, they are bound to disclose to patients all
relevant information about illnesses and treatment options.18
The procedure of informed consent has been legalised in order to
protect patients by providing them with complete information on which
to make an informed decision. In parallel, it is also expected to protect
doctors from ﬁnancial liability provided that the procedure is properly
executed. Leaving aside the legal implications of informed consent that
we shall not consider in this work, it is generally recognised that this
procedure is surrounded by a crucial problem of communication: it is
arduous to determine the way of adequately informing patients, and
making them understand the information given. In other words, the
main question here is: when is the disclosure of information sufﬁcient?
The literature in this area suggests one four approaches concerning
the level of disclosure:
1. The reasonable physician standard (or professional standard): this stan-
dard allows the physician to determine what information is appropriate
to disclose.
2. The reasonable patient standard (or objective standard): it focuses on
considering what a patient would need in order to understand the deci-
sion at hand.
3. The subjective standard: it requires tailoring information to each
patient.
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4. The emergency standard: when valid consent is not possible, the profes-
sional standard usually obtains.19
All the above approaches show limitations either due to the fact
that they are focussed on the physician, rather than the patient, and
the former tends to tell the latter very little, or on the evidence that is
rather difﬁcult, especially for the limited amount of time that doctors
have at their disposal, to tailor medical advice according to patient’s
individual needs. Guidelines have been given on how information
should be generally delivered. These guidelines mainly encourage phy-
sicians to avoid a medical terminology and a technical jargon and to
encourage patients to ask questions (Lowe and Karridge, 1997).
From the point of view of this paper, there is another important
factor to consider. Doctors must give patients enough information on
the reasons why they support certain lines of treatments. And this is
precisely the aspect on which we shall focus in the following para-
graphs. By drawing on some key concepts from argumentation theory,
we shall show how doctors’ choices of the kind of reasons given in
support of advice can impact on the delivery of information that are
appropriate for making informed decisions.
4.2. The analytic method
In discussing some of the arguments contained in the interactions
recorded, we rely on the operations suggested by Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1992, p.93):
1. Recognizing the points at issue.
2. Recognizing the positions that the parties adopt.
3. Identifying the explicit and implicit arguments.
4. Analysing the argumentation structure.
As far as points 1 and 2 are concerned, in all the arguments selected
doctors give their standpoints on the kind of treatment that, according
to them, patients should follow. Patients never express a difference of
opinion. Yet, the reasons for thinking that in our dialogues doctors per-
form acts of argumentation, and not simply give information are clear.
Next to the treatments suggested there are always possibilities of other
treatments (including the non-treatment option). This justiﬁes the pres-
ence of argumentative moves which aim at supporting doctors’ beliefs in
the value of their advice.20 As far as point 3 is concerned, we will focus
on arguments whose standpoints are explicit, and underline their even-
tually implicit premises with parentheses. As for point 4, the analysis of
the arguments structure will be made by integrating the terminology
developed by Van Eemeren et al. (2002, pp. 62–87) with a focus on
some relevant aspects of the structures of arguments as codiﬁed in
classical rhetoric. More speciﬁcally, according to classical rhetoricians,
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the eﬃcacy of argumentations was seen as resulting from speakers main
abilities: (1) to ﬁnd the right contents, (2) to dispose them according to
the best order, (3) to use an adequate wording. Here the reference is to
the abilities presented among others by the anonymous author of Rhet-
orica ad Herennium in the following passage:
The speaker, then, should possess the faculties of Invention [the Latin inventio],
Arrangement [dispositio], Style [elocutio]... Invention is the devising of matter, true
or plausible, that would make the case convincing. Arrangement is the ordering and
distribution of the matter, making clear the place to which each thing is to be as-
signed. (Rhetorica ad Herennium, I, 3)21
By using the above indications analytically, we intend to test whe-
ther doctor’s choices at the level of invention, arrangement and word-
ing can indeed suggest some normative elements for an optimisation of
their argumentation within the framework of the informed consent.
4.2.1 On the inventio
In what follows, three arguments will be analysed.
We read in dialogue 10:
04 D: This carcinoma has been already treated. And today
05 visit is due to something diﬀerent. We have discussed again the
06 situation with the internal radiologists. The decision is that instead of
07 doing the emboli, an embolization again, it is better to do a
chemotherapy.
The doctor supports his view that the patient should do chemother-
apy, by using a single argumentation from authority that is by claim-
ing that the treatment has been suggested by a team of experts. In a
schematic overview:
1 
P has to do chemotherapy 
1.1 
The internal radiologists had a meeting and 
decided that the chemotherapy is the best 
treatment
(1.1’) 
& P should do what the radiologists say 
(1.1’.1) 
The internal radiologists are the experts 
and they know what is best for P 
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Here the reasons adduced in justiﬁcation of the standpoint do not
reveal any clinical information about the inner motivations for choos-
ing that treatment. Unless the patient has already a correct knowledge
of chemotherapy, and is able to understand his/her case by himself, this
argument prevents him/her from making any critical reﬂection oriented
to decide or not for the treatment. In the above situation this choice of
argument is even more problematic because, we know from other parts
of the dialogue, the patient went to the doctor knowing that in a previ-
ous consultation a different treatment (namely the embolization) had
been suggested. But in the above passage, there is no explanation of
why doctors decided to suggest a different clinical action. As a matter
of fact, this patient at lines 57–59 of the dialogues interrupts the doctor
and asks for an explanation about the change in the treatment:
57 P. I have another question doctor. Why, I mean, before you have
58 decided for the embolization and now for the chemotherapy?
Clearly, if the patient had been passive, he would have missed some
essential information.
We read in dialogue 5:
29 D: The exams that you have done while you were at the hospital
30 have revealed that there is a contraction at the esophagus, and
31 there cancer cells have been found. It is for this reason that
32 we must do the therapy.
The scheme of the above coordinative argument runs as follows:
1 
P. has to do chemotherapy 
(1.1a) 
Chemotherapy is active against cancer 
cells 
1.1b 
Clinical exams have revealed that P has 
cancer at the esophagus 
The doctor suggest that the patient should have chemotherapy by
giving as reason the clinical evidence that medical tests of the oesopha-
gus have revealed cancerous cells. In comparison with the previous
case, in this argument the disclosure of information is higher.
However, at the level of inventio the doctor has only partially tailored
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the information given according to the situation of this patient, and
has provided him with a general reason that does not necessarily moti-
vate the conclusion. The problem in giving too general information is
that the patient may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to fully understand why this is the
best course of action to take for his/her situation. As a matter of fact,
having a cancer is not a necessary reason for doing chemotherapy. It
is widely known that in some cases of cancer, chemotherapy is not rec-
ommended, and surgeries or other kind of less invasive treatments can
be taken instead. In this light, a patient who has been given only gen-
eral information might not understand why s/he should do something
that, strictly speaking, could be done diﬀerently.
The situation is however different in dialogue 1.
At the beginning of the conversation, the doctor argues in favour of
a treatment of radiotherapy. But the problem is that, according to the
doctor, radiotherapy is not enough: he would like the patient to start
other two treatments, namely the hormonal therapy and the chemo-
therapy together. To do so, the doctor articulates his argumentation
and gives several reasons that deserve to be quoted at length. In the
passage, the doctor is presumably aware that the patient might not like
a further treatment. In this sense his answer seems to take into account
a possible objection by the patient to the addition of the chemotherapy.
46 D: Our problem now is to control the possibility that some cells have
47 spread around. By analysing the pure biological characteristics
48 of this tumour have seen that it reacts to hormonal receptors.
49 Thus, you could only do this hormonal therapy.
50 The hormonal therapy is a pill, called tamoxifene,
51 that in practice interacts with the receptors of hormones in order
52 to stop the spread of these cancer cells.
53 It is a pill that normally you take for ﬁve years.
54 It is useful for the whole body and it is also useful to protect
55 your breast from eventual other tumours.
56 In fact, if one has had a cancer somewhere,
57 the person has more possibilities to have a breast cancer
58 than the person who did not have a contralateral cancer.
59 In this case, a pill would also partly protects you from this
60 possibility. Going back to what you should do,
61 this is surely a radiotherapy and
62 surely the hormonal therapy.
63 Now we have to decide whether or not we should
64 also add this bloody chemotherapy. Without any doubts at your
age, maybe in
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65 worse conditions, we would be happy to give only the pill. Speaking
66 frankly, the addition of chemotherapy in this situation would
67 increase the possibility of healing.
68 Considering your situation, your age, the lymph nodes and
69 your general state this imply having a 6–7% further possibilities
70 to heal. This is really the main point of the issue
...
81 By doing the hormonal therapy we diminish both the possibility
82 of developing another cancer in another part of the body and
83 the possibility that your illness appears again about 10%.
84 If we also add the chemotherapy we add another 6–7%
85 of possibility of healing...
The structure of the above complex argument is the following:
1 
P has to do hormonal treatment and 
chemotherapy 
1.1a 
Hormonal treatment increases 
the possibility of healing of 
10% 
1.2.1 
For the age, the 
situation of the lymph 
nodes and so forht, she 




Chemotherapy increases the 














The relevant aspect concerning the reasons given in the above argu-
ment is that the doctor is not simply saying that, because the patient
has been diagnosed with cancerous cells, she should undertake this
course of action, like in the previous case. But he motivates the con-
clusion by illustrating the advantages of the two treatments proposed
as inserted in the clinical situation of this patient. The doctor explains
in detail what the treatments suggested are, and how they would work
in the context of this patient. We could say that the reasons for
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suggesting a treatment have been tailored in accordance with the spe-
ciﬁc characteristics of the patient.
4.2.2 On the dispositio
In considering the arrangement of the contents that doctors use in argu-
ing their standpoint, we shall pay attention to the relationship between
the order of presentation of the contents and the disclosure of informa-
tion required by patients to make critical decisions about treatments.
Here, a main factor arises from our analysis. As we have seen at para-
graph 4.1, the procedure of informed consent requires physicians to dis-
cuss with patients, among other things, the treatment suggested, its
nature and side effects. But in the dialogues observed, we noted that
doctors tend to arrange these contents as if they were separated one
from the other, and had no logical connection. More speciﬁcally, there
are cases where a doctor suggests a treatment and argues in favour of it
without however explaining what the treatment is. The explanation only
comes in a different stage of the consultation. As the following case
shows, this separation might de-optimise the exchange of information.
In dialogue 8, at lines 132 ff. the doctor mentions the patient differ-
ent treatments and suggests chemotherapy:
132 D: You did the bronchoscopy. They aspirated some catarrh. There
133 was a big inﬂammation.
134 But some cells were of tumoral origin, and you did surely
135 understand this...
136 P: Of course.
137 D: Nowadays we have more treatments, and these are of
138 diﬀerent kinds. They are chemotherapeutic, radiotherapeutic
139 and sometimes surgical.
140 Today there are some other treatments that are not
141 chemotherapeutic, but that we cannot do at this stage.
142 Thus, while the illness is on, the ﬁrst approach is surely to ﬁght
141 the cancer with a chemotherapy.
The doctor develops a coordinative argumentation of the following
kind:
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1 
Among several possibilities of treatment  
P has to start with chemotherapy 
1.1a 
Chemotherapy is active 
against cancer cells 
1.1b 
Bronschopy has 
revealed cancer cells 
1.1c 
We cannot do other non- 
chemotherapeutic 
treatments 
From the perspective of this paper, the above argument has three
main limitations. Firstly, the reasons adduced by the doctor are of the
similar kind to those analysed in the second argument of the previous
paragraph. Secondly, the doctor does not provide reasons why the pa-
tient should do chemotherapy instead of the other treatments men-
tioned. In particular, he does not give reasons to support the
unfeasibility of non-chemotherapeutic treatments. Thirdly, and we en-
ter into the domain of dispositio, the doctor does not explain at this
stage what all the treatments is talking about are, and not even what
the chemotherapy that he would like the patient to start is. This omis-
sion is even more problematic because several lines later, after having
visited the patient, the doctor recalls his standpoint – that the patient
should do chemotherapy – and even mentions the possibility of even-
tually adding radiotherapy:
259 D: Surely, in theory, we should do chemotherapy. Eventually
260 this could be associated with radiotherapy.
261 I mean the mix of chemo and radio
262 could be done. It is a bit more toxic,
263 but we do it if we think that it is right
264 to do it in a second time. It is
265 better to do only chemotherapy at the beginning.
266 We shall see in a second time
267 if it is possible to use medicaments in a higher dose.
Only after having proposed the treatments, the doctor asks the
patient if he knows what chemotherapy and radiotherapy is. And the
answer is negative:
265 D: Do you know what chemo and what radiotherapy are?
266 P: Could you explain it?
Thus, at lines 267–315, the doctor gives then a very general expla-
nation of what these two treatments are. Now suggesting a treatment
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without explaining from the start, what it is and how it works might
prevent the patient from understanding why it is actually been
advised. More speciﬁcally, the problem of giving a general and sepa-
rate description of the treatment is that the patient must then infer by
him/herself how this treatment would work in his/her case. As already
mentioned, this can be problematic since, in the majority of cases, the
patient is not an expert in the ﬁeld. Indeed, in dialogue 7, the doctor
argues in favour of a treatment composed both of chemotherapy and
radiotherapy by mentioning the possibility of success, but without
explaining what they are. At lines 114 the patient interrupts the doctor
and asks for this explanation, as this information was crucial to
understand the doctor’s position:
110 D: A way of increasing the possibility of success would be to do this
111 chemotherapeutic treatment ﬁrst and then, after a few cycles, some
112 radiotherapy more or less associated with some
113 more chemotherapy depending...
114 P: Chemotherapy? What is it?
Here, again, we can wonder about the quality of this patient’s deci-
sion making, if he had not been active enough to ask for an explana-
tion of the treatment.
4.2.3 On the elocutio
The literature on the modalities of wording health messages in
doctor–patient interaction is vast. A lot has been written on the
wording of the questions that doctors ask patients, on the use of meta-
phors and other rhetorical devices and so forth.22 In the framework of
this paper, however, we want to focus our attention on some of the
words used by physicians while declaring their standpoints. Our inves-
tigation stresses that physicians must show the reasons behind their
standpoints, and enable patients to think about the choice to be made.
As will be shown, there are cases where the use of certain modal verbs
and other linguistic expressions seem to play down the fact that it is
the patient who has to make the ﬁnal decision, and that no treatment
suggested by physicians is strictly speaking necessary.
In dialogue 1, the doctor tells the patient that he should have che-
motherapy because this increases the possibility of healing by 6/7%.
Yet, before starting to explain what kind of chemotherapy he is think-
ing about, he remarks that the there is still a decision to be made be-
fore proceeding with the actual treatment:
81 D: By doing the hormonal therapy we diminish of about 10% both
82 the possibility to develop another cancer
83 in another part of the body and
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84 the possibility that your illness appears again. If we also add the
85 chemotherapy we add another 6–7% of possibility of healing.
...
87 The kind of chemotherapeutic treatment if you and I decide to do it
88 will be a mix of two medicaments
The same attitude is recognisable in a passage of dialogue 10, where
the doctors uses the expression ‘‘we are thinking’’ clearly underlining
that the suggestion he gives only represents the medical point of view:
22 D: We are thinking about doing a chemotherapy that consists
23 in giving two medicaments...
Again, in dialogue 9 the doctor speciﬁes that what he advises is sim-
ply a proposal:
50 D: This is then the main point. It has been conﬁrmed during
51 the surgery that it is a malignant tumour...
...
64 Thus, in these situations, we always propose a treatment based
65 on chemotherapy that we call adjuvant
On the contrary, in the following case the doctor uses the modal
verb ‘‘must’’ that, for its strength, could give the patient the impres-
sion that this is the necessary and only possible option:
Dialogue 5
30 D: There is this contraction at the esophagus
31 and there we have found tumorous cells
32 It is for this reason* that we must do the chemotherapy.
It might be the case that in terms of treatments available this is the
only applicable, or the only solution that could be beneﬁcial. Yet, an
imperative wording like this is in contrast with giving the patient the
option of non-treatment, even if this last choice is in contrast with
doctor’s point of view.
Finally, we have noted how in some of the interactions recorded doc-
tors argue in favour of their standpoints by also introducing percentages
of the possibility of healing. Instead of simply saying that a treatment
has beneﬁcial effects, and show what these are, they also try to quantify
the beneﬁt itself. Percentages, on the one hand, accentuate the precari-
ousness of the nexus treatments-expected result in medical issues, on the
other they hand can give patients more objectivity in pondering a cer-
tain decision, as well as a concrete datum on which they can base the
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decisions themselves. The passages in questions read as follows. In dia-
logue 9, the doctor, while arguing in favour of chemotherapy, remarks:
84 D: The chemotherapy does not protect you completely from having
85 a relapse. These are things that you should know.
86 It reduces of about 15% the possibility
87 that your illness appears again there or in another part.
88 There is a high possibility that you’re already ﬁne. We can further
89 increment this possibility by doing chemotherapy.
90 Unfortunately, in medicine we cannot assure 100% results.
Again, in dialogue 1, the doctor argues in favour of a mixed treat-
ment and inserts percentages about its beneﬁts:
78 D: Unfortunately, in medicine we cannot be 100% sure
79 that we get maximum results.
80 We say that by doing the radiotherapy we diminish
81 the possibility of a local relapse.
82 If we do the hormonal therapy we diminish of about 10%
83 both the possibility of having another tumour
84 in another part of the body and the relapse of the illness.
85 By adding the chemotherapy we add another 6–7%
86 of possibilities of healing.
5. CONCLUSION
Throughout this article we have been considering the nature and
impact of argumentation in doctor–patient interaction. One of the most
important theses of our analysis is that argumentation should be con-
sidered as a powerful instrument for the performance of a balanced
relationship between doctors and patients. Another important conclu-
sion of our analysis is that a reﬂection on doctors’ choices at the level
of the selection, arrangement and style of arguments can highly impact
on the transfer of information that are relevant for enhancing patients’
decision making. In the dialogues observed, we have noted how generic
reasons, as well as a separation of topics that are logically connected,
can fail to provide crucial information for understanding doctors’
standpoints. Again, the wording of doctors’ advice can create an imbal-
ance in the doctor–patient relationship, insofar as it can prevent pa-
tients from considering possibilities of treatments other than those
suggested by their doctors during the medical encounter. We have
stressed on more than one occasion, that our investigation is only
exploratory. More systematic studies based on a wider corpus of dia-
logues are surely needed. A canon of normative advice for enhancing a
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critical discussion between doctors and patients should be created. This
would presuppose a deeper and more structured understanding of the
argumentative manoeuvrings that occur between doctors and patients.
In particular it should be determined whether different argumentation
strategies make a difference in patients’ response in term of adherence.
Again, a possible line of investigation would entail exploring what
counts as reasonable or unreasonable argument within this context.
This last point, in particular, would then motivate further research on
the use and impact of fallacies in the medical setting. Finally, more
analyses are needed on the nature of the contents that doctors uses in
their arguments and, in particular, on the shift between emotional ver-
sus medical contents. To cut a long story short, there seems to be a lot
at stake in the ﬁeld! But at the stage of the present analysis, if we have
succeeded in giving a challenging glimpse into the richness of argumen-
tation in the medical consultation, then we will have achieved our aim.
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NOTES
1 See Plato’s Gorgias 456 A, where the philosopher asserts through the characters of his
master Socrates and the sophist Gorgias that doctors and orators should work together.
2 See in particular Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004).
3 Thus, Grasso et al. (2000) 53 attempt to apply the New Rhetoric’s system of argumenta-
tion to the domain of health promotion, without fully exploring what argumentation actually
is there. The authors assume a distinction between beliefs and opinions which does not seem
to be altogether clear. Beliefs appear among the material causes of opinions. Bachers et al.,
(2002) focus on the argumentative burdens of self-advocacy. This perspective, although inter-
esting, needs to be implemented by an analysis of the argumentative features and potentiali-
ties of the doctor’s role. It is in fact generally recognised that in the typical physician–patient
interaction doctors are dominant while patients are submissive. See, for example, Ballard-
Reisch (1990) and Frederikson (1993). Upshur and Colak (2003) focus almost exclusively on
the role and use of evidence-based approaches to support conclusions and recommendations.
Finally, Dickinson (1998) uses a model of argumentation to make explicit the nature and
function of data in decision-making. In his paper, however, it is not clear where and in what
context he sees argumentation. The ambiguity of his approach seems to derive from the fact
that he considers the term argumentation in the wide and general sense of reasoning. But,
although argumentation is indeed a process of reasoning, not every process of reasoning is
argumentation.
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4 Evidence-based Medicine working group (1994) and Upshur and Colak (2003, p. 283).
5 See in particular Schulz (2003).
6 On this point see in particular Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958, Ch. 1).
7 Van Eemeren et al. (2002, p. 24).
8 On the implicit/explicit diﬀerence of opinion see, more speciﬁcally, Schulz and Rubinelli
(2006, pp. 88–92).
9 See Aristotle’s on the concept of krite´s as underlined by Rigotti and Greco (2005).
10 On this point see more in Van Eemeren et al. (2002, pp. 228–29).
11 See for example Eddy (1990), Laine and Davidoﬀ (1996) and Tan NHSS (2002) with fur-
ther references.
12 As Walton (1985, p. 8) remarks: ‘‘...a contract...requires exchange of ‘‘clearly deﬁned com-
modities or beneﬁts. The patient hands over his fee (directly or indirectly, depending on med-
ical funding practices of the locality), but what commodity does the doctor produce in
exchange? The premises of fallibility of treatment outcomes suggests that the doctors may be
unwise, even foolish, to contract for speciﬁc outcome in advance’’.
13 See Davis (1997, p. 178).
14 See Chin (2002), Wear (1998), Pellegrino (1979) and Beauchamp (1994).
15 See in particular Walton’s chapter on practical reasoning (1985, pp. 69–98).
16 See Ballard-Reisch (1990) and Frederikson (1993).
17 For requesting the original quotations, please send an email to sara.rubinelli@lu.unisi.ch.
18 For a full analysis of the structure of the informed consent see Faden and Beauchamp
(1986) and Doyal (2000).
19 For a full treatment of this topic see Applebaum et al. (1987).
20 On the diﬀerence between explanation and argumentation see Henkemans (2001).
21 In classical rhetoric, the oﬃcia oratoris are actually ﬁve. To the three already mentioned
the author also quotes ‘‘memory’’ that is the ﬁrm retention in the mind of the matter, words,
and arrangement, and ‘‘delivery’’ that is the graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and
gesture. The concepts of memory and delivery will be however left out of our analysis. Mem-
ory becomes in fact relevant only when speeches are long, prepared in advance and presented
without any technological support. Delivery becomes a pertinent category in considering the
emphatic aspects of the dialogues that, however, we do not intend to analyse within our per-
spective.
22 For a review speciﬁcally focussed on the oncological setting see Bredart et al. (2005). See
also Maguire and Pitceathly (2002) and Caﬃ (2002).
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